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The Optimal Capital Structure Decision of Depository
Financial Intermediaries: A Contingent Claim Analysis
This paper attempts to develop the optimal capital structure of
depository financial intermediaries integrating the operating and
financial decisions. We draw together deposit insurance, reserve
requirement, liquiditv services and taxation. An option pricing
framework is used to value the claims of each interest group, i.e.,
deposit holders, equity holders,, the Fed, the FDIC and the tax
authority. Our results admit various capital structures, corner solu-
tions and interior optimums, depending upon the characteristics of the
firm's cash flows and upon the tax, insurance and regulatory environ-
ment in which it operates. In particular we show that the interaction
of operating and financing decision results in a much richer array of
possible structure than previously perceived.

The Optimal Capital Structure Decision of Depository
Financial Intermediaries: A Contingent Claim Analysis
If there is an accepted academic view on the capital structure,
it probably echoes Myers's view that it is a puzzle. Possibly some
consensus exists that taxation and other market imperfections counter-
balance in a nonlinear fashion that may result in an interior optimal
capital structure, but may equally well produce empirically embarrassing
corner solutions. Not surprisingly, the capital structure puzzle for
the depository financial intermediary is in no better shape. One view
is that the competitive banking process will result in a similar capi-
tal structure irrelevancy proposition that may exist under similar con-
ditions for any other firm (see Fama (1980)). But this leaves the
relevance of financial intermediaries unexplained. Other models
suggest high leverage based upon the gains from liquidity services
(Sealey (1983)) or an intermediate optimal leverage based upon the
effects of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) insurance
and regulation superimposed upon the usual tax and agency arguments
(Buser, Chen and Kane (1981)).
The capital structure issue is especially challenging for the case
of banks. For banks, there is no clear conceptual separation of
operating and financing decisions. Deposits might alternatively or
simultaneously be considered to be operating revenue or debt capital.
Thus, as pointed out by Sealey (1983), we cannot conveniently assume
the operating decisions have been made and then separately analyze the
financing decision.
-2-
Our purpose is to provide a somewhat broader treatment of the
capital structure issue than previously undertaken. For example Fama
(1980) suggests that the capital structure problem is essentially no
different for financial and nonfinancial firms; the balancing of tax
effects and other imperfections may well result in an interior optimum.
Buser, Chen and Kane (1981) go one step further. They superimpose the
effects of FDIC coverage and argue that the joint effect of premium
and regulatory cost will not disturb the prospect of a non-corner
solution. Sealey (1983) takes issue with both views, demonstrating
that the liquidity services provided by depository institutions are
not compatible with the separation of operating and financing deci-
sions. Consequently, analysis derived for nonfinancial firms cannot
be uncritically used to explain the capital structure of a financial
intermediary. He shows that this liquidity effect alone is sufficient
to explain nonzero leverage and may produce an interior optimum. His
work, however, can be criticized of assuming the default risk away
and overlooking the fact that liquidity effect is of no importance to
the time deposits that account for 70 percent of the bank deposits.
Our contribution is to follow Sealey in addressing the simulta-
neity of operating and financing decisions. However we argue that
such interdependence of operating and financing decisions also affects
the tax subsidy provided by leverage and the value to the bank of
FDIC coverage. Both effects turn out to be more complex than pre-
viously supposed and cannot be universally signed as previously
assumed.
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The various leverage effects analyzed do not act uniformly in one
direction and are not necessarily linear. The result is that we are
left with a rich array of possible capital structures, which leaves
little difficulty in explaining why such institutions exist. On a
different level, our contribution is to show that the implicit assump-
tion behind the piecemeal approach, that leverage effects can be iso-
lated and are additive, is incorrect. The various leverage effects we
analyze are intertwined through their dependence upon operating
earnings.
After setting out assumptions, we analyze capital structure in a
world with reserve requirements but without taxes or FDIC insurance
through Section V. In Section VI we introduce FDIC insurance under
the alternative assumptions of actuarial pricing and the current flat
rate pricing. In Section VII tax effects are added and a brief con-
clusion follows in Section VIII.
Assumptions
1. The depository institution is referred to as a bank. The bank
holds only deposit debt. The asset portfolio, which we refer to as
loans, is financed by deposits and by initially contributed equity. The
bank is subject to a reserve requirement such that a portion of its
deposits must be held in cash, or no interest "near cash."
2. The model is constructed in a single period with financing and
operating decisions made at the beginning of the period and operating
flows accruing at the end of the period.
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3. The bank is assumed to maximize its value. This objective can
be supported under somewhat weaker assumptions than complete markets
(see DeAngelo (1981)).
4. Claims on the bank will be valued as options. Since our pur-
pose is to make fairly general propositions about capital structure we
do not need to use a specific valuation model. However, to sign
various derivatives of the option value function we need to assume that
options are rationally priced in the sense of Merton (1973).
I. RESERVE REQUIREMENTS
As noted in the introduction, depository financial intermediaries
are distinct from nonfinancial firms in the sense that the financial
decision of the former requires a simultaneous integration with the
operating decision. In order to compare the capital structure decision
of depository intermediaries with the Modigliani-Mi Her Theorem I,
we assume first that the capital market is perfect, without deposit
insurance (which is unique to the depository intermediary) and taxes.
Consider a bank which finances its loan portfolio and reserve re-
quirements with bank deposits and equity capital. The bank deposit
is the only form of debt for the bank. In the U.S. banking system, a
bank is subject to a reserve requirement imposed by the Federal Reserve
Bank (Fed), so that some of the bank assets must be held in a non-
interest bearing cash or near cash (i.e., cash in the bank vault or the
deposits with the Fed). It should be noted that major parts of the
bank loans are usually in the form of demand deposits in the transac-
tions accounts. Therefore, reserve requirements are assessed both in
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relation to Lime and demand deposits. Bank reserves are used to meet
deposit-withdrawals occurring randomly throughout the period. Thus,
every bank is faced with a random reserve loss over the period, and is
required to pay any penalty costs resulting from a reserve deficiency.
In our single-period model, a bank must pay the incurred penalty costs
of reserve deficiency before any of its assets can be liquidated and
distributed to the depositors and shareholders of the bank at the end
of the period.
Let K be the required reserve of the bank, which is determined by
the amount of the bank's time deposits and demand deposits created by
making bank loans. The current reserve requirements are set at
12 percent of the demand deposits and 3 percent of the time deposits.
However, the reserve requirements are in part influenced by bank de-
cisions regarding the leverage and the loan policies. Let R and FL,
be the bank reserves held at the beginning and at the end of the
period, respectively. At the end of the period, the reserve defi-
ciency penalty cost (RP„) charged by the Fed can be expressed as
follows
:
RP
T
= max[9(K-R
T ),0] (1)
?
where 9 = the proportional penalty costs of reserve deficiency."
It can be seen from Eq. (1) that, in the presence of reserve re-
quirements in the banking system, the Fed owns a claim equal to 9
times a put option against the bank. The put option has an exercise
price equal to the reserve requirement, K, and the underlying asset
is the reserve held by the bank. Using option pricing, the current
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2
value of the put held by the Fed can be expressed as P(R,K,o D ), whereR
2
o is the variance of the rate of changes in bank reserve.
R
I I . VALUATION OF DEPOSITS
The following additional notation will be utilized in our formal
model of the valuation of a banking firm with reserve requirements:
A = the gross market value of bank assets at the end of the
period;
A = the net market value of bank assets (i.e. , net of the reserve
deficiency penalty costs (RP )) at the end of the period.
That is
A^ = Aj - max[9(K-R
T ),0];
B = the total promised payments to the bank depositors at the
end of the period.
At the end of the period, the bank depositors receive the total
promised payments if the net market value of bank assets is greater
than or equal to the total promised payments; otherwise they receive
the net market value of bank assets. Thus, the value of bank deposits
at the end of the period in the presence of reserve requirements can
be expressed as follows:
D
?
= min[A
T
,B
T ]
min^ - max[9(K-R
T
),0],B
T}
. (2)
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Eq. (2) indicates that the claim of the bank depositors in the
presence of reserve requirements is a complex option. It has captured
both the reserve requirement and the default risk, the special features
in banking operations. The value of a complex option can be deter-
3
mined using; the option pricing technique. We define an asset H which
pays nothing until the end of the period and pavs A,^ - max[9(K-R ),0l
at time T. Let H(A,R,K) be the current value of asset H, where A is
the current value of bank assets, R and K are the current bank reserve
and the reserve requirement, respectively. As defined earlier, P(R,K)
is the current value of a European put option on bank reserve, R, which
has an exercise price equal to K. Thus,
H(A,R,K) = A - 9P(R,K) (3)
where P(R,K) = put option with relevant parameters in parenthesis.
In other words, the current value of asset H is equal to the cur-
rent value of bank assets minus 9 times a put option on bank reserve
with an exercise price equal to the reserve requirement of the bank.
With these results, we can express the end-of-period value of bank
deposits as a function of the value of asset H :
D
T
= min[H
T
,B
T
].
Therefore, the current value of bank deposits can be expressed as
follows
:
D = B - P(H,B
T ),
(4)
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where
D = the current value of bank deposits in the presence of
reserve requirements;
B = the present value of the total promised payments, dis-
counted at the riskfree rate of interest, r, that is,
B = B
T
e~
r
.
Thus, in the presence of reserve requirements, the current value of
bank deposits is equal to the present value of the total promised pay-
ments, minus a complex put option, P(H,BT ). Intuition suggests that
the presence of Fed's put option reduces the market value of bank
assets. The contingent claim analysis affirms and formalizes this
intuition. Therefore, Federal reserve requirements reduce the current
4
value of bank deposits.
Based upon Eq . (4) we can show some interesting properties of the
value of bank deposits in the presence of reserve requirement as
follows
:
— =
-P — > (5a)
3A H 3A ?
U ° ;
3D
- P
3H
>> n (SM 5
3R "
"
HlR > ° 5b)
3D -rT 3P N . f - .
ib; =e -™; yo (5c)
w=-phH<° (5d »
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3D 3P
2 2
3a 9a
< (5e)
^ = -PH ^2 < (5f)
3P(H,B
T ) 2
where Pu = 575 and a is the variance of the rate of return onH 3 H
bank assets.
The above results indicate that the value of the bank deposits
increases if the value of the bank assets or the value of the bank re-
serve increases. The value of the bank deposits also increases if
the promised payments increase, but it decreases if the required bank
reserve increases. Intuitively, the put option in (4) can be inter-
preted as the actuarial risk premium in equilibrium, which is a posi-
tive function of the reserve requirement but a negative function of the
current bank reserve. This will be further discussed in section VI.
Finally, the value of the bank deposits decreases if the risk of bank
assets or the risk of reserve loss increases.
III. RISK PREMIUMS ON DEPOSITS
Before we examine further the properties of the market value of
bank deposits given in Eq . (4), it is useful to derive the value of
bank deposits and the risk premium on bank deposits in the simpler case
of no reserve requirement using the Black-Scholes option pricing
formula. It can be seen that if there were no reserve requirement,
the reserve deficiency penaltv costs, max[9 (K-R ) ,0] , would vanish and
the current value of bank deposits could be expressed as
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DQ
= B - P(A,B
T ),
(6)
where D
n
= the current value of bank deposits in the absence of re-
serve requirement.
Comparing Eqs. (6) and (4), DQ > D, since P(A,BT ) < P(H,BT ).
Using the well-known Black-Scholes option pricing formula, D
n
can be
expressed explicitly:
DQ
= AN(-d
x
) + BN(d
2
) (7)
where,
£n(A/B
T
) + (r + -|o 2 )T
d =
a/T
d
2
= d - a/T;
2
a = the variance of the rate of the return on bank assets;
and
N(*) = the cumulative standard normal distribution.
We also can show the relationship between the value of a risky
bank deposit as given in Eq. (7) and the value of a riskfree bank
deposit (i.e., fully insured deposit). We define L = B/A as the
leverage factor and rewrite Eq. (7) as
DQ
= B[L
_1
N(-d
1
) + N(d
2
)] (8)
Or simply,
D
Q
= B'G, (8')
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where G = [L N(-d ) + N(d )], is a price discount factor which re-
flects the risk of default of the hank deposits, and <[ G
_< 1.
From Eq. (8') the price discount factor, G, is a function of the
bank's leverage factor, the risk of bank assets, and the time to
maturity as indicated below:
G = G(L,"a"
2
,T) (9)
Following Merton (1974), the yield on bank deposit is derived in
the absence of reserve requirement. Let y be the yield on the bank
-yT
deposits as defined in the equation, D~ = BTe , then,
in[B
T
/D
Q ]
v =
^n^B
T
/B.G]
(from Eq. (8'))
-o rrl fcn[B /B]
= r +
' n
l
L ' J
. (using r = ± ) (10)
Eq. (10) indicates that the excess yield on bank deposits,
y' = y - r, is a function of the bank's leverage factor, the risk of
bank assets, and the time to maturity as follows:
+ +
2
+
y' = y'(L,a ,T). (11)
It should be noted that, in the presence of reserve requirement,
the excess yield on bank deposits should be larger than that indi-
cated in Eq . (11). On the other hand, if banks provide liquidity ser-
vice to the depositors in terms of lower costs of meeting transactions
demand for money, the excess yield should be smaller than that given in
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Eq. (11). The yield should include both the risk, premium (larger if
the risk of default is higher) and the liquidity premium (smaller if
bank deposits provide greater liquidity service).
Therefore, even if the liquidity premiums are approximately the
same among firms in the banking industry (because of a perfect compe-
tition in liquidity services), it does not follow that the risk
premiums of different banks will be the same. Thus, the yield cannot
be expected to be the same among a large number of different banks.
One can raise serious questions about the validity of Sealey's (1983)
conclusion on optimal capital structure for a banking firm based upon
the assertion that the risk premium on bank deposit is uniform across
all firms in the banking industry.
Thus, it is clear that a bank's leverage policy, investment policy
and required reserve management policy jointly determine the yield
on the bank's deposits.
IV. VALUATION OF EQUITY CLAIMS
The preceding contingent claims analysis can be employed to derive
the current value of bank equity in the presence of reserve require-
ments. The residual claim of shareholders of the bank at the end of
the period can be expressed as
S
T
= max[A* - B
T>
0]. (12)
Therefore, the current value of the bank equity is given as
follows
:
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S = C(H,B
T
)
= C(A - 9P(R,K),B
T ),
(13)
where C( ) = the call option with relevant parameters in the
parenthesis.
Eq. (13) indicates that the equity of a bank in the presence of
reserve requirement is equal to a complex call option to purchase
asset H from the bank, depositors with an exercise price equal to B_,
the total promised payments to bank depositors. The effect of reserve
requirements is represented as the issue of a put option on bank
reserve to the Fed, which reduces the current value of the bank equity,
V. OPTIMAL CAPITAL STRUCTURE WITH RESERVE REQUIREMENTS
For analytic convenience, to examine the impact of a leverage
change on the total value of a banking firm in the presence of reserve
requirement, we can express the boundary conditions of two alternative
end-of-period bank states with two possible sub-states for each:
Alternative States Conditions
I. Bank Solvent A
_> B
A. Sufficient Reserve K <' R,^
B. Insufficient Reserve K > ^
II. Bank Insolvent A < B
A. Sufficient Reserve K < ^
B. Insufficient Reserve K > R,^
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For each of these possible states, the claims of depositors,
stockholders, and the Fed at the end of the period may be listed as
follows
:
Sum of Depositors
States Depositors Stockholders Fed and Stockholders
IA B
T A.J,
- B
T
A
T
IB B
T
A
T
-e(K-R
T
)-B
T
9(K-R
T
) AT
-e(K-R
T )
IIA A^ A
T
I IB A
T
-0(K-R
T
) 6(K-RT ) AT-9(K-RT )
In the prpxoncz: of reserve requirements the sum of the depositors'
and the stockholders' claims is A_, in states IA and IIA, and is
A -9(K-R ) in states IB and IIB. In the absence of reserve require-
ments, the sum of the depositors' and the stockholders' claims will be
A_ in all states. Thus, the value of a bank is affected negatively by
the reserve requirement.
The total current value of a bank in the absence of reserve re-
quirement is A, while the total current value of the bank in the
presence of reserve requirement is D + S = A - 9P(R,K). In the pre-
sence of reserve requirements the value of a bank is
V
LR
= V
U
" 9P(R
'
K) (14)
where V = the value of a levered bank in the presence of
LK
reserve requirements;
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V = the value of an unlevered bank in the absence of
market Imperfections such as reserve requirement,
deposit insurance and taxes. This bank will be
termed a "pure bank.
"
Therefore, if we ignore the possible effect of reserve requirement
on reducing the agency costs of a bank, there will be a negative joint
effect of the leverage and the reserve requirement on the value of a
3 P 3 P 3 K
bank, since -r-r— = — • -rr— > 0. The implication is that all banks3d 3K 3d
should have the zero-deposit corner solution to the capital structure
decision. Of course, this result is contrary to the empirical obser-
vations in the banking industry. However, there are several plausible
explanations of why banks hold deposits. These explanations include
the popular tax-incentive arguments, the liquidity-service argument of
Sealey (1983), the most recent agency-cost-reduction argument of Fama
(1985), and the benefit of deposit insurance under the current banking
system. In the next section, we attempt to analyze the joint effects
of reserve requirement and deposit insurance on the value of a bank and
to provide an explanation of the presence of bank deposits in the capi-
tal structure.
VI. OPTIMAL CAPITAL STRUCTURE WITH RESERVE REQUIREMENT
AND FDIC INSURANCE BUT WITHOUT TAXES
We assume that the FDIC provides full insurance protection to depo-
sit holders, i.e., that all accounts do not exceed $100,000 which is the
current limit of protection per depositor. This implies that deposits
are riskless from the viewpoint of the depositors. As shown in the pre-
vious section, in the presence of reserve requirement, the claim of the
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depositors at the end of the period is BT if the hank is solvent and is
AT = A-
- max[8(K-R ),0] if the bank is insolvent. With full insurance
protection from the FDTC, the claim of the depositors is B in all pos-
sible bank states. Thus, in the presence of both the reserve requirement
and the deposit insurance the claims of depositors, stockholders, the
Fed, and the FDIC at the end of the period may be listed as follows:
Sum of Depositors
States Depositors Stockholders Fed FDIC and Stockholders
I
A
B
T
A
T
- B
T
A
T
IB B
T
A
T
-9(K-R
T
)-B
T
8(K-R
T )
A
T
-9(K-R
T )
IIA B
T
A
T
- B
T
B
T
IIB B
T
6(K-R
T )
A
T
-6(K-R
T
)-" B
T
B
T
It is clear from the above table that the presence of deposit insur-
ance results in further changes in the value of depositors' and stock-
holders' claims. The sum of depositors' and stockholders' claims with
and without reserve requirements (RR) and deposit insurance (DI) is now
summarized.
Sum of Depositors' and Stockholders' Claims
Without RR
States and DI
IA A
T
IB A
?
IIA \
IIB A
T
With RR With RR
Only and DI
^
A
T
a
t
-9(k-r
t )
a
t
-9(k-r
t )
^
B
T
A
t
-9(K-R
t )
B
T
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Therefore, in the presence of both the reserve requirement and
the deposit insurance, leverage affects the total value of a bank
through its effects on the cost of reserve requirement and the benefit
of deposit insurance under the current banking system. Before we
analyze these effects in detail, we shall first examine the fair value
of deposit insurance.
From Eq. (4) we know that the deposit insurance in the presence of
reserve requirement is simply a complex put option with an exercise
price equal to B . Thus, the fair value of the deposit insurance (1)
must be equal to the current value of this complex put option. That
is
1 = P(A-8P(R,K),B
T
). (15)
The following properties of the deposit insurance can be easily
obtained
:
il<
: 2JL>o- ^<o-
3A *
U
' 3B
T
? U
' 9R ^
U
'
(16)
~ > 0; Hj > 0; and Hj > °-
3a da
R
The contingent claims analyses have helped us identify the cost
of reserve requirement as a put option given to the Fed and the bene-
fit of deposit insurance as a put option acquired from the FDIC.
Therefore, the total value of a levered bank in the presence of re-
serve requirement and deposit insurance (V ) can be expressed as:
LK L
= V.. + AV(R) + AV(I), (17)
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where AV(R) = -9P(R,K)
= the change in total value of a bank, due to reserve
requirement
;
AV(I) = P(H,B ) - Insurance Premium
= the change in total value of a bank due to deposit
insurance.
Eq. (17) indicates that the total value of a levered bank is equal
to the. sum of the value of the pure bank, the change in value due to
reserve requirement, and the change in the value due to deposit in-
surance. Leverage affects the value of the bank through its influences
on reserve requirement and deposit insurance. To address these effects,
we must first clarify the insurance structure and financing of the
insurance premium. In our single-period model, we assume that the pre-
mium is paid at the beginning of the period.
In a contingent claim framework, the actuarial value of insurance
is the equilibrium value of a complex put option as shown in Eq. (15).
However, the FDIC currently charges a flat rate premium b on deposits.
Since the flat rate does not discriminate between banks according to
their default risk (other than on the basis of size), it effectively
subsidizes high risk banks at the expense of low risk banks (see
Campbell and Glenn (1984)). These subsidies would be removed if each
bank faced an insurance premium equal to the actuarial value of the
loss payment. Therefore, in order to separate the effects of the
transfer of risk under the insurance arrangement from the effects of
the specific pricing structure adopted by the FDIC, we compare two
alternative premium structures.
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A. Optimal Capital Structure with an Actuarially
Fair FDIC Premium
If the FDIC adopted a fair risk-adjusted pricing of insurance,
then the premium for deposit insurance should be set equal to the
current value of the insurance put as given in Eq. (15). With such a
fair price, AV(I) will be zero and the value of the bank will be
V
LRI
= V
U
- 9 P(R,K). (18)
which is identical to (14); the FDIC insurance has a neutral effect
on the total value of the bank. This result is not surprising. The
gain from the insurance accruing collectively to equity holders and
deposit holders is zero. Certainly the insurance brings benefits to
the deposit holders since the current value of their deposits is
increased. In equilibrium, the value of this benefit is the value of
the put option as discussed earlier. However, the insurance is priced
at its actuarial value so that equity holders must pay a premium which
also is equal to the value of the insurance put. In total, the FDIC
insurance has a neutral effect on the combined value of deposits and
equity. However, it is important to note that this does not imply
that the deposit holders are net gainers and the equity holders are
net losers from the insurance provision. The deposit interest rate
will reflect the presence or absence of insurance. In summary,
insurance per se does not necessarily affect the optimal capital struc-
ture. If insurance is actuarially priced, the cum-insurance value of
the bank coincides with its uninsured value at every level of leverage.
This point also has been made by Merton (1977), Sharpe (1978) and
Buser, Chen and Kane (1981).
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B. Optimal Capital Structure with FDIC Flat Rate Premium
If the FDIC charges a flat rate b on deposits, the premium is bB =
bLA and the change in total value of a bank due to deposit insurance
will be
AV(I) = P(H,B
T
) - bLA (19)
The total value of a levered bank is
V
LRI
= [V
U "
9P(R
'
K)] + [ p < H»V " bLA] * (20)
Note that the first square bracket is the same as both the "no
insurance" and the "fair insurance" case. The second part represents
the value added by the insurance contract, i.e., the difference be-
tween the put option and the insurance premium.
Before examining the effect of insurance on the capital structure,
it is worthwhile to note that (20) suggests adverse selection prob-
lems as those encountered in private insurance markets in which dif-
ferences in loss expectancy are not reflected in premium rates (see
Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976)). If the flat premium is of sufficient
value to cover the average default costs of all banks in the market,
the second square bracket in (20) will be positive for higher than
average risk banks and negative for lower than average risk banks.
This implies that the incentive to join the FDIC is higher for higher
than average risk banks and this factor in particular helps explain
the other regulatory activities of the FDIC such as entry regulation,
inspection of bank records and supervision of managerial activity, etc.
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The effects of changes in leverage on the value of the hank, can he
examined by taking the partial derivative of V in (20) with respect
to L as follows:
It can be seen from (21) that the leverage affects the value nega-
tively through reserve requirement and positively through deposit in-
surance. The combination of the two effects in the opposite direction
yields various possible optimal capital structure depending on which
effect dominates over what range of L. Therefore, it can be shown
that the financial structure is relevant to the value of the banking
firm and an interior optimal capital structure can be reached even
without the consideration of tax subsidy and bankruptcy costs. This
result is due to the interaction between the financing decision and the
operating decision which is caused by the reserve requirement. Note
that the reserve requirement affects the Fed's put option through the
exercise price, and the FDIC insurance put option through the under-
lying asset.
VII. OPTIMAL CAPITAL STRUCTURE WITH TAXES IN THE PRESENCE
OF RESERVE REQUIREMENT AND DEPOSIT INSURANCE
In the corporate finance theory taxes have been a dominant factor
for explaining an increase in leverage ever since the Modigliani-Miller
theorem. In this section the effects of corporate taxes on the value
of the bank in the presence of reserve requirement and deposit
insurance are analyzed using the contingent claims analysis. Some
simplifying assumptions are made in our single-period model, t is the
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corporate tax rate which, for convenience, is assumed to apply to the
end-of-period net worth. To maintain the analogy with the deductihility
of interest payments under the U.S. income tax code, the bank's entire
debt is assumed to be deductible from the tax base. Furthermore, both
the reserve deficiency penalty costs and the insurance premium are tax
deductible. With these assumptions, the claims of depositors, the
stockholders, the Fed, the FDIC and the tax-man at the end of the period
may be listed as follows:
Stockholders Fed FDIC Tax-man
(l-T)(A
T
-B
T
-bB) bB T(A
T
-B
T
-bB)
(l-T)(A
T
-9(K-R
T
)-B
T
-bB) 9(K-R
T
) bB t (A^e (K-R
T
)-B
T
-
A
T
-B
T
9(K-R
T
) A
T
-B
T
-9(K-R
T
)
Therefore, in the presence of corporate income taxes, the value of
a levered bank with reserve requirements and deposit insurance is dif-
ferent from that without them. This is apparent from comparing the sums
of the depositors' and the stockholders' claims in the two different
cases given below:
Sum of Depositors' and Stockholders' Claims
With RR and DI
(1-t)A
t
+ tB
t
- (l-x)bB
(1-t)A
t
+ xB
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t
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t
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t
IIB U-t)A
t
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If the tax system is asymmetric such that the tax authority takes
a proportion (t) of taxable income when they are positive but makes no
refund when they are negative, the tax authority has a claim which is
equivalent to a call option on t times the firm's taxable income with
zero exercise price (or t times a call option on the total income with
exercise price equal to the tax deductions) (see Pitts & Franks (1984),
Smith and Stultz (1984), and Galai (1983)). Thus, in the presence of
reserve requirement and deposit insurance, the current value of the tax
authority's claim (t) can be expressed as follows:
T = tC(A,TD), (22)
where TD = the total tax deductions
= max[9(K-R
T
),0] + B
T
+ bB
Therefore, in the presence of reserve requirement and deposit insurance,
the tax authority's claim is a complex call option as shown in (22).
The exercise price of this call option is equal to the sum of the tax
deductions that includes the reserve deficiency penalty costs, the
interest payments and the deposit insurance premium.
The total value of a levered bank in the presence of reserve re-
quirement, deposit insurance, and taxes (V ) can be expressed as
V
LRIT
= V
U
+ AV(R) + AV(I) + AV(T) (23)
where AV(T) = the change in total value of a bank due to the tax
deductions interest payments, reserve deficiency
penalty costs and deposit insurance premium.
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It can be seen that 3AV(T)/3L is positive because 9T/3L is negative.
It is clear now that the optimal capital structure of depository
intermediaries is influenced by not only the reserve requirement, but
also the insurance put option and government tax call option whose
value is influenced in turn by the insurance and the reserve require-
ment which affect the exercise price. Note again that the Modigliani-
Miller theorem with taxes (e.g., 100 percent leverage) would hold only
in a special case, i.e., in the absence of reserve requirement and
8
financial transaction cost, and where insurance is fairly priced.
Consistent with the literature for nonfinancial firms, leverage
reduces the value of the government's corporate income tax claim on
the bank. But here, the tax subsidy includes some additional ef feels
that are peculiar to the financial intermediary. In examining the
effects of leverage on the value of the insurance put, we saw that the
reserve requirement created interdependence between operating and
financing decisions. A similar effect emerges in valuing the tax call
option. Through its effect on the expected value and variance of
operating earnings, the reserve requirement reduces the effect of
leverage on the value of the tax option.
It is also notable that (23) indicates that the risk affects the
value of the bank in three ways, through the reserve requirement put,
through the insurance put and through the tax call, which has important
implications for the risk management of depository financial inter-
mediaries.
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VIII. CONCLUSION
The optimal capital structure issue can be described at best as a
puzzle in the corporate finance theory. This issue is especially
challenging for the case of depository financial intermediaries since
there is no clear conceptual separation of operating and financial
decisions. Deposits might be considered to be operating revenue or
debt capital alternatively. This paper has attempted to develop the
optimal capital structure of depository intermediaries integrating the
operating and financial decisions. An option pricing framework was
used to value the claims of each interest group, i.e., deposit holders,
equity holders, the Fed, the tax authority and the FDIC.
First, this paper demonstrates an array of possible capital struc-
tures including corner solutions and interior optima even without taxes
and other market frictions. This result was due to the reserve
requirement and the deposit insurance which are unique to depository
financial institutions. We also showed that the optimal capital struc-
ture would not change even in the presence of the FDIC insurance if it
were priced at its actuarially fair value. However, the current FDIC
flat rate premium can provide either positive or negative effects on
the leverage decision. Finally, the addition of taxes provides only
positive effects on the leverage decision.
In particular, this paper has demonstrated that the well-known
Modigliani-Miller theorems without taxes and with taxes would hold for
depository intermediaries only in a special case where the reserve
requirement is not imposed, the financial transactions of investors
are cost-free and the FDIC charges actuarially fair premiums. All of
-26-
the positive and negative effects of various factors relevant to the
capital structure decision in this paper are due to the fact that the
financial and operating decisions are not separate from each other in
depository financial institutions. The question of which effect
dominates over what range of leverage remains to be answered.
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Footnotes
See Myers (1984) for the capital structure puzzle and its
complete list of literature.
2
In case of reserve deficiency, the bank is required either to
purchase the Federal Fund or to liquidate some of its assets in order
to meet the reserve requirement. The penalty costs include the oppor-
tunity costs involved in purchasing the Federal Fund and liquidating
the assets as well as the direct penalty.
3
See Stulz (1982), Chen (1983), and Stulz and Johnson (1985) for
the applications of option pricing technique to price various complex
options.
4
For simplicity, we ignored the possible effect of reserve require-
ment on reducing the agency costs of a bank.
This result is based upon the assumption that an increase in the
portion of R in the asset side of the bank balance sheet, for the given
level of total capitalization, will not increase the risk of bank
assets. Had this not been the case, the direction of the result would
be reversed.
The flat rate is currently one-twelfth of one percent. The
F.D.I.C. may call for subsequent adjustment in the light of collective
loss experience. We will ignore this feature for simplicity.
See Campbell and Glenn (1984) for more details in the adverse
selection problem and Buser, Chen and Kane (1981) for a slightly
different view of the FDIC's other regulatory activities.
o
If all financial transaction costs are ignored, the bank has no
comparative advantage in providing liquidity services since they can be
created at no cost by the depositors direct transactions.
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